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Abstract
Levesque introduced a notion of “only knowing”, with the goal of capturing certain types
of nonmonotonic reasoning. Levesque’s logic dealt with only the case of a single agent.
Recently, both Halpern and Lakemeyer independently attempted to extend Levesque’s logic
to the multi-agent case. Although there are a number of similarities in their approaches, there
are some significant differences. In this paper, we reexamine the notion of only knowing,
going back to first principles. In the process, we simplify Levesque’s completeness proof,
and point out some problems with the earlier definitions. This leads us to reconsider what
the properties of only knowing ought to be. We provide an axiom system that captures our
desiderata, and show that it has a semantics that corresponds to it. The axiom system has
an added feature of interest: it includes a modal operator for satisfiability, and thus provides
a complete axiomatization for satisfiability in the logic K45.
1 Introduction
Levesque [14] introduced a notion of “only knowing”, with the goal of capturing
certain types of nonmonotonic reasoning. In particular, he hoped to capture the type
of reasoning that says “If all I know is that Tweety is a bird, and that birds typically
fly, then I can conclude that Tweety flies”.1 Levesque’s logic dealt only with the
case of a single agent. It is clear that in many applications of such nonmonotonic
reasoning, there are several agents in the picture. For example, it may be the case
that all Jack knows about Jill is that Jill knows that Tweety is a bird and that birds
typically fly. Jack may then want to conclude that Jill knows that Tweety flies.
Recently, each of us [5, 12] independently attempted to extend Levesque’s logic to
the multi-agent case. Although there are a number of similarities in the approaches,
there are some significant differences. In this paper, we reexamine the notion of only
knowing, going back to first principles. In the process, we point out some problems
with both of the earlier definitions. This leads us to consider what the properties
of only knowing ought to be. We provide an axiom system that captures all our
desiderata, and show that it has a semantics that corresponds to it. The axiom
system has an added feature of interest: it involves enriching the language with a
modal operator for satisfiability, and thus provides an axiomatization for satisfiability
in K45. Unfortunately, the semantics corresponding to this axiomatization is not as
natural as we might like. It remains an open question whether there is a natural
semantics for only knowing that corresponds to this axiomatization.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review
the basic ideas of Levesque’s logic and provide an alternative semantics. The use of
the alternative semantics leads to a simplification of Levesque’s completeness proof.
In Section 3, we review Lakemeyer’s approach, which we call the canonical-model
approach, and discuss some of its strengths and weaknesses. In Section 4, we go
through the same process for Halpern’s approach. In Section 5, we consider our new
approach. Much of the discussion in Sections 3, 4, and 5 is carried out in terms of
three critical properties of Levesque’s approach which we cull out in Section 2. In
particular, we examine to what extent each of the approaches satisfies these properties.
In Section 6, we show how the logic can be used, and discuss its relationship to Moore’s
autoepistemic logic [15]. Levesque showed that the single-agent version of his logic of
only knowing was closely connected to autoepistemic logic. We extend his result to
the multi-agent case. We conclude in Section 7 with some discussion of only knowing.
2 Levesque’s Logic of Only Knowing
We begin by reconsidering Levesque’s definition. Let Φ be a set of primitive propo-
sitions. Let ONL(Φ) be a propositional modal language formed by starting with
the primitive propositions in Φ, and closing off under the classical operators ¬ and
∨ and two modalities, L and N . We omit the Φ whenever it is clear from context
or not relevant to the discussion. We freely use other connectives like ∧, ⇒, and
⇔ as syntactic abbreviations of the usual kind. In addition, we take Oα to be an
1The reader should feel free to substitute “believe” anywhere we say “know”. Indeed, the formal
logic that we use, which is based on the modal logic K45, is more typically viewed as a logic of belief
rather than knowledge.
1
abbreviation for Lα∧N¬α. Here Lα should be read as “the agent knows or believes
(at least) α”, Nα should be read as “the agent believes at most ¬α” (so that N¬α is
“the agent believes at most α”) and Oα should be read as “the agent knows only α”.
We define an objective formula to be a propositional formula (i.e., a formula with no
modal operators), a subjective formula to be a Boolean combination of formulas of
the form Lϕ or Nϕ, and a basic formula to be a formula which does not mention N .
Levesque gave semantics to knowing and only knowing using the standard possible-
worlds approach. In the single-agent case, we can identify a situation with a pair
(W,w), where w is a possible world (represented as a truth assignment to the primitive
propositions) and W consists of a set of possible worlds. Intuitively, W is the set of
worlds which the agent considers (epistemically) possible, and w describes the real
world. We do not require that w ∈ W or that W 6= ∅.2 As usual, we say that the
agent knows (at least) α if α is true in all the worlds that the agent considers possible.
Formally, the semantics of the modality L and the classical connectives is given as
follows.
(W,w) |= p if w |= p if p is a primitive proposition.
(W,w) |= ¬α if (W,w)|6=α.
(W,w) |= α ∨ β if (W,w) |= α or (W,w) |= β.
(W,w) |= Lα if (W,w′) |= α for all w′ ∈ W .
Notice that if Lα holds, then the agent may know more than α. For example, Lp
does not preclude L(p∧ q) from holding. This is why we should think of Lα as saying
that the agent knows at least α.
It is well-known that this logic is characterized by the axiom system K45. For
convenience, we describe K45 here:
Axioms:
P. All instances of axioms of propositional logic.
K. (Lϕ ∧ L(ϕ⇒ ψ))⇒ Lψ.
4. Lϕ⇒ LLϕ.
5. ¬Lϕ⇒ L¬Lϕ.
Inference Rules:
R1. From ϕ and ϕ⇒ ψ infer ψ.
R2. From ϕ infer Lϕ.
The axioms 4 and 5 are called the positive introspection axiom and negative intro-
spection axiom, respectively. They are appropriate for agents that are sufficiently
introspective so that they know what they know and do not know.
How do we give precise semantics toN? That is, when should we say that (W,w) |=
Nβ? Intuitively, Nβ is true if β is true at all the worlds that the agent does not
consider possible. It seems fairly clear from the intuition that we need to evaluate
the truth of β in worlds w′ /∈W ,3 since these are the worlds that the agent considers
impossible in (W,w). But if β is a complicated formula involving nested L operators,
then we cannot simply evaluate the truth of β at a world w′. We need to have a set
of worlds too. In fact, the set of possible worlds we use is still W . That is, while
2By requiring that W is nonempty, we get the modal logic KD45; by requiring that w ∈ W , we
get S5.
3Note that, since we defined worlds extensionally as truth assignments, the set of impossible
worlds is well-defined and fixed for a given W .
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evaluating the truth of β in the impossible worlds, the agent keeps the set of worlds
he considers possible fixed. Formally, we define
(W,w) |= Nα if (W,w′) |= α for all w′ /∈W .
Let us stress three important features of this definition.
• First, as we have already observed, the set of possibilities is kept fixed when we
evaluate Nα.
• Second, the set of conceivable worlds—the union of the set of “possible” worlds
considered when evaluating L and the set of “impossible” worlds considered
when evaluating N—is fixed, independent of the situation (W,w); it is always
the set of all truth assignments.
• Finally, for every set of conceivable worlds, there is a model where that set is
precisely the set of worlds that the agent considers possible.
Roughly speaking, the first property is what is required for A4, while the second
property is what is required for A5. The intent of the third property is to make it
possible that any objective formula can be “all you know.” As we shall see in Section 5,
in a precise sense, the third property is somewhat stronger than we actually need. All
we really need is that for any objective formulas the set of all worlds satisfying these
formulas can be considered possible. We return to these properties for guidance when
we discuss possible ways of extending Levesque’s semantics to the multi-agent case.
Since Oα is an abbreviation for Lα ∧N¬α, we have that
(W,w) |= Oα if for all worlds w′, w′ ∈ W iff (W,w′) |= α.
As it stands, the semantics has the somewhat odd property that there are situa-
tions that agree on all basic beliefs yet disagree on what is only believed. As pointed
out by Levesque [14], the problem is that there are far too many sets of worlds than
there are basic belief sets. In order to find a perfect match between the sets of ba-
sic beliefs an agent may hold and sets of worlds, Levesque introduces what he calls
maximal sets of worlds. In essence, a maximal set is the largest set in the sense that
adding any other world to it would change the agent’s basic beliefs. Furthermore,
every set of worlds can be extended to a unique maximal set of worlds. It is well
known that in the logic K45, an agent’s beliefs are completely determined by his be-
liefs about objective formulas (see, for example, [8] for a proof). Thus, we define a
maximal set as follows:
Definition 2.1 If W is a set of worlds, let
W+ = {w | for all objective formulas ϕ, if (W,w)|=Lϕ then (W,w)|=ϕ}.
W is called maximal iff W =W+.
Levesque defines validity and satisfiability with respect to maximal sets only. In
particular, a formula α is valid iff for every maximal set of worlds W and every world
w ∈W , we have (W,w)|=α.
We end this review of Levesque’s logic by presenting (a slight variant of) his proof
theory.
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Axioms:
A1. All instances of axioms of propositional logic.
A2. L(α⇒ β)⇒ (Lα⇒ Lβ).
A3. N(α⇒ β)⇒ (Nα⇒ Nβ).
A4. σ ⇒ Lσ ∧Nσ for every subjective formula σ.
A5. Nα⇒ ¬Lα if ¬α is a propositionally consistent objective formula.
Inference Rules:
MP. From α and α⇒ β infer β.
Nec. From α infer Lα and Nα.
Axioms A2–A4 tell us that that L and N separately have all the properties of K45-
operators. Actually,A4 tells us more; it says that L andN are mutually introspective,
so that, for example, Lϕ⇒ NLϕ is valid. Perhaps the most interesting axiom is A5,
which gives only-knowing its desired properties. Its soundness depends on the fact
that the union of the set of worlds considered when evaluating L and the set of worlds
considered when evaluating N is the set of all conceivable worlds.4
Theorem 2.2 [14] If Φ is infinite, then Levesque’s axiomatization is sound and com-
plete for the language ONL(Φ) with respect to Levesque’s semantics.
As we shall see, the assumption that there are infinitely many primitive proposi-
tions in Φ is crucial for Levesque’s completeness result. Extra axioms are required if
Φ is finite. In addition, it is interesting to note that the assumption that L and N are
interpreted with respect to complementary sets of worlds is not forced by the axioms.
In particular, for the soundness of Axiom A5, it suffices that the sets considered for
L and N cover all conceivable worlds; they may overlap. The following semantics
makes this precise.
Define an extended situation to be a triple (WL,WN , w), where WL and WN are
sets of worlds (truth assignments) such thatWL∪WN consists of all truth assignments.
Define a new satisfaction relation |=x that is exactly like Levesque’s except for L- and
N -formulas. For them, we have
(WL,WN , w) |=x Lα if (WL,WN , w′) |=x α for all w′ ∈ WL
(WL,WN , w) |=
x Nα if (WL,WN , w
′) |=x α for all w′ ∈WN .
Note that L and N are now treated in a completely symmetric way.
Theorem 2.3 For all Φ, Levesque’s axiomatization is sound and complete for the
language ONL(Φ) with respect to |=x.
Proof We omit the soundness proof, which is straightforward. Note that for axiom
A5 to be sound it suffices that WL and WN together cover all worlds. In particular,
it does not matter whether or not the two sets overlap.
To prove completeness, we use the notion of a maximal consistent set. Given an
arbitrary axiom system AX , we say that a formula ϕ is consistent with respect to AX
4Note that, while unusual, the axiom schema A5 is recursive, since consistency of formulas in
classical propositional logic is decidable. Hence the axioms themselves are recursive. As noted in [14],
this is a problem in the first-order case, however. In fact, Levesque’s proof theory for the first-order
version of his logic was recently shown to be incomplete [7].
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if it is not the case that AX ⊢ ¬ϕ, where, as usual, we use ⊢ to denote provability. A
finite set of formulas ϕ1, . . . , ϕn is consistent with respect to AX if the conjunction
ϕ1∧ . . .∧ϕn is consistent with respect to AX . An infinite set of formulas is consistent
with respect to AX if every finite subset of its formulas is consistent with respect to
AX . Finally, given a set F of formulas, a maximal consistent subset of F is a subset
F ′ of F which is consistent with respect to AX such that any superset of F ′ is not
consistent with respect to AX .
In the following, provability, consistency, and maximal consistency all refer to
Levesque’s axiom system unless stated otherwise. To prove completeness we show
that every consistent formula is satisfiable with respect to |=x, using a standard
canonical model construction [9, 10].
Let Γ0 be the set of all maximal consistent sets of formulas in ONL(Φ). For
θ ∈ Γ0, define θ/L = {α | Lα ∈ θ} and θ/N = {α | Nα ∈ θ}. We then define
• ΓθL = {θ
′ ∈ Γ0 | θ/L ⊆ θ′},
• ΓθN = {θ
′ ∈ Γ0 | θ/N ⊆ θ′}.
If we view maximal consistent sets as worlds, then ΓθL and Γ
θ
N represent the worlds
accessible from θ for L and N , respectively. The following lemma reflects the fact
that L and N are both fully and mutually introspective (axiom A4).
Lemma 2.4 If θ′ ∈ ΓθL ∪ Γ
θ
N , then Γ
θ′
L = Γ
θ
L and Γ
θ′
N = Γ
θ
N .
Proof We prove the lemma for θ′ ∈ ΓθL. The case θ
′ ∈ ΓθN is completely symmetric.
To show that ΓθL = Γ
θ′
L , it clearly suffices to show that θ/L = θ
′/L. Let α ∈ θ/L.
Then Lα ∈ θ and also LLα ∈ θ by axiom A4. Thus Lα ∈ θ′ (since θ′ ∈ ΓθL implies
that θ/L ⊆ θ′) and, hence, α ∈ θ′/L.
For the converse, let α ∈ θ′/L. Thus, Lα ∈ θ′. Assume that α 6∈ θ/L. Then
¬Lα ∈ θ (since θ is a maximal consistent set) and, therefore, L¬Lα ∈ θ, from which
¬Lα ∈ θ′ follows, a contradiction.
The proof that Γθ
′
N = Γ
θ
N proceeds the same way, that is, we show that θ/N =
θ′/N . Let α ∈ θ/N . Then Nα ∈ θ and also LNα ∈ θ by axiom A4. Hence Nα ∈ θ′,
so α ∈ θ′/N .
For the converse, let α ∈ θ′/N . Thus, Nα ∈ θ′. Assume that α 6∈ θ/N . Then
¬Nα ∈ θ and also L¬Nα ∈ θ, from which ¬Nα ∈ θ′ follows, a contradiction.
In traditional completeness proofs using maximal consistent sets (see, for example,
[9, 10]), a situation is constructed whose worlds consists of all maximal consistent sets.
Here, we must be a little more careful.
We say that a maximal consistent set θ contains a truth assignment w if for all
atomic formulas p, we havew |= p iff p ∈ θ. Clearly a maximal consistent set θ contains
exactly one world; we denote this world by wθ. For θ ∈ Γ0, let W
θ
L = {wθ′ | θ
′ ∈ ΓθL}
and W θN = {wθ′ | θ
′ ∈ ΓθN}.
Lemma 2.5 (a) (W θL,W
θ
N , wθ) is an extended situation.
(b) For all α, we have α ∈ θ iff (W θL,W
θ
N , wθ) |=
x α.
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Proof For part (a), to show that (W θL,W
θ
N , wθ) is an extended situation, we must
show that W θL ∪ W
θ
N consists of all truth assignments. By way of contradiction,
suppose there is a truth assignment w not in W θL ∪W
θ
N . Let Fw = {p ∈ Φ | w |=
p} ∪ {¬p | p ∈ Φ, w |= ¬p}. Fw ∪ θ/L cannot be consistent, for otherwise there
would be some θ′ ∈ ΓθL that contains Fw , which would mean that w ∈ W
θ
L. Similarly
Fw ∪ θ/N cannot be consistent. Thus, there must be formulas ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3, ϕ4 such
that ϕ1 and ϕ2 are both conjunctions of a finite number of formulas in Fw , ϕ3 is
the conjunction of a finite number of formulas in θ/L, and ϕ4 is the conjunction of
a finite number of formulas in θ/N , and both ϕ1 ∧ ϕ3 and ϕ2 ∧ ϕ4 are inconsistent.
Thus, we have ⊢ ϕ3 ⇒ ¬ϕ1 and ⊢ ϕ4 ⇒ ¬ϕ2. Using standard modal reasoning
(A2, A3, and Nec), we have ⊢ Lϕ3 ⇒ L¬ϕ1 and Nϕ4 ⇒ N¬ϕ2. Since Lψ ∈ θ for
each conjunct ψ of ϕ3, standard modal reasoning shows that Lϕ3 ∈ θ. Similarly, we
have Nϕ4 ∈ θ. Since θ is a maximal consistent set, both L¬ϕ1 and N¬ϕ2 are in θ.
Since ⊢ L¬ϕ1 ⇒ L(¬ϕ1 ∨ ¬ϕ2) and ⊢ N¬ϕ2 ⇒ N(¬ϕ1 ∨ ¬ϕ2), it follows that both
L(¬ϕ1 ∨ ¬ϕ2) and N(¬ϕ1 ∨ ¬ϕ2) are in θ. But this contradicts A5, since ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 is
a propositionally consistent objective formula.
For part (b), the proof proceeds by induction on the structure of α. The statement
holds trivially for atomic propositions, conjunctions, and negations. In the case of
Lα, we proceed by the following chain of equivalences:
Lα ∈ θ
iff for all θ′ ∈ ΓθL, we have α ∈ θ
′
iff for all θ′ ∈ ΓθL, we have (W
θ′
L ,W
θ′
N , wθ′) |=
x α (using the induction hypothesis)
iff for all wθ′ ∈ W θL, we have (W
θ
L,W
θ
N , wθ′) |=
x α (by Lemma 2.4)
iff (W θL,W
θ
N , wθ) |=
x Lα.
The case Nα is completely symmetric.
The completeness result now follows easily. Let α be a consistent formula and θ a
maximal consistent set of formulas containing α. By Lemma 2.5, (W θL,W
θ
N , wθ) |=
x α.
Levesque considered only maximal sets in his definition of validity. In fact, this
restriction has no effect on the notion of validity.
Corollary 2.6 A formula α ∈ ONL(Φ) is valid iff (W,w) |= α for all situations
(W,w) (including nonmaximal W ).
Proof If Φ is finite, it is easy to check that W+ = W for all sets W , so the result
is trivially true if Φ is finite. So suppose Φ is infinite. Notice that each situation
(W,w) corresponds to an extended situation (WL,WN , w), where WL = W and WN
is the complement of W . Let us call such an (WL,WN , w) an extended complemen-
tary situation. Theorems 2.2 and 2.3 together imply the valid formulas obtained when
considering all extended situations remain the same when we restrict ourselves to com-
plementary situations with maximal WL. The corollary then follows from the fact
that the set of all extended situations properly includes the set of all extended com-
plementary situations, which in turn includes the set of all extended complementary
situations with maximal WL.
As Theorem 2.3 shows, for the |=x semantics, Levesque’s axioms are sound and
complete for all sets Φ of primitive propositions. On the other hand, as we said earlier,
6
Levesque’s completeness proof (with respect to his semantics) depends crucially on
the fact that Φ is infinite. If Φ is finite, Levesque’s axioms are still sound with respect
to his semantics, but they are no longer complete. For example, if Φ = {p}, then
¬L¬p ⇒ N¬p would be valid under |=; this does not follow from the axioms given
above. In fact, for each finite set Φ of primitive propositions, we can find a new axiom
scheme that, taken together with the previous axioms, gives a complete axiomatization
for ONL(Φ) for Levesque’s semantics if Φ is finite.5 The new axiom, which subsumes
axiom A5, allows us to reduce formulas involving N formulas involving only L.
Note that worlds, which are truth assignments to the primitive propositions Φ, are
themselves finite if Φ is finite. Hence we can identify a world w with the conjunction
of all literals over Φ that are true at w. For example, if Φ = {p, q} and w makes p
true and q false, then we identify w with p ∧ ¬q. For any objective formula α, let
Wα,Φ be the set of all worlds (over the primitive propositions Φ) that satisfy α. The
axiom system AXΦ is then obtained from Levesque’s system by replacing A5 by the
following axiom:
A5Φ. Nα ≡
∧
w∈W¬α,Φ
¬L¬w if ¬α is a propositionally consistent objective formula.
The axiom is easily seen to be sound since it merely expresses that Nα holds atW
just in case W contains all worlds that satisfy ¬α. Note that this property depends
only on the fact that L and N are defined with respect to complementary sets of
worlds and, hence, also holds in the case of infinite Φ. However, it is only in the
finite case that we can express this axiomatically. Completeness is also very easy to
establish. Levesque [14] showed that in his system, even without A5, every formula
is provably equivalent to one without nested modalities. With A5Φ, we then obtain
an equivalent formula that does not mention N . In other words, given a formula
consistent with respect to AXΦ, a satisfying model can be constructed with the usual
technique for K45 alone.
Theorem 2.7 AXΦ is sound and complete for the language ONL(Φ) with respect
to Levesque’s semantics, if Φ is finite.
3 The Canonical-Model Approach
How do we extend our intuitions about only knowing to the multi-agent case? First we
extend the language ONL(Φ) to the case of many agents. That is, we now consider a
language ONLn(Φ), which is just like ONL except that there are modalities Li and
Ni for each agent i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, for some fixed n. In the remainder of the paper, we
omit the Φ, just writing ONL and ONLn, since the set of primitive propositions does
not play a significant role. By analogy with the single-agent case, we call a formula
basic if it does not mention any of the operators Ni (i = 1, . . . , n) and i-subjective
if it is a Boolean combination of formulas of the form Liϕ and Niϕ. What should
be the analogue of an objective formula? It clearly is more than just a propositional
formula. From agent 1’s point of view, a formula like L2p or even L2L1p is just as
“objective” as a propositional formula. We define a formula to be i-objective if it is
a Boolean combination of primitive propositions and formulas of the form Ljϕ and
5This was also the situation for the logic considered in [4]. In that paper, a simple axiomatization
was provided for the case where Φ was infinite; for each finite Φ, an extra axiom was needed (that
depended on Φ).
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Njϕ, j 6= i, where ϕ is arbitrary. Thus, q∧N2L1p is 1-objective, but L1p and q∧L1p
are not. The i-objective formulas true at a world can be thought of as characterizing
what is true apart from agent i’s subjective knowledge of the world.
The standard model here is to have a Kripke structure with worlds and accessi-
bility relations that describe what worlds the agents consider possible in each world.
Formally, a (Kripke) structure or model is a tuple M = (W,pi,K1, . . . ,Kn), where W
is a set of worlds,6 pi associates with each world a truth assignment to the primitive
propositions, and Ki is agent i’s accessibility relation. Given such a Kripke structure
M , let KMi (w) = {w
′ : (w,w′) ∈ Ki}.7 KMi (w) is the set of worlds that agent i
considers possible at w in structure M . As usual, we define
(M,w) |= Liα if (M,w′) |= α for all w′ ∈ KMi (w).
We focus on structures where the accessibility relations are Euclidean and transitive,
where a relation R on W is Euclidean if (u, v) ∈ R and (u,w) ∈ R implies that
(v, w) ∈ R, and R is transitive if (u, v) ∈ R and (v, w) ∈ R implies that (u,w) ∈ R.
We call such structures K45n-structures. It is well known [2, 9] that these assumptions
are precisely what is required to get belief to obey the K45 axioms (generalized to n
agents). We say that a formula consistent with these axioms is K45n-consistent. An
infinite set of formulas is said to be K45n-consistent if the conjunction of the formulas
in every one of its finite subsets is K45n-consistent.
Now the question is how to define the modal operator Ni. The problem in the
multi-agent case is that we can no longer identify a possible world with a truth
assignment. In the single-agent case, knowing the set of truth assignments that the
agent considers possible completely determines his knowledge. This is no longer true
in the multi-agent case. Somehow we must take the accessibility relations into account.
A general semantics for an N -like operator was first given by Humberstone [11] and
later by Ben-David and Gafni [1]. In this approach, the semantics of Ni is given as
follows:
(M,w) |= Niα if (M,w′) |= α for all w′ ∈W −KMi (w).
The problem with this definition is that it misses out on the intuition that when
evaluating Niα, we keep the set of worlds that agent i considers possible fixed. If
w′ ∈W −KMi (w), there is certainly no reason to believe that K
M
i (w) = K
M
i (w
′).
One approach to solving this problem is as follows: If w and w′ are two worlds
in M , we write w ≈i w′ if KMi (w) = K
M
i (w
′), i.e., if w and w′ agree on the possible
worlds according to agent i. We then define
(M,w) |= Niα if (M,w
′) |= α for all w′ such that w′ ∈W −KMi (w) and w ≈i w
′.
While this definition does capture the first of Levesque’s properties, it does not
capture the second. To see the problem, suppose we have only one agent and a
structure M with only one possible world w. Suppose that (w,w) ∈ KM1 and p is
true at w. Then it is easy to see that (M,w) |= L1p ∧ N1p, contradicting axiom
A5. The problem is that since the structure has only one world and it is in KM1 (w),
6Note that here W denotes the set of all worlds of the particular model M , not just the (epis-
temically) possible ones as in Levesque’s logic.
7We use the superscript M since we shall later need to talk about the Ki relations in more than
one model at the same time.
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there are no worlds in W − KM1 (w). Thus, N1p is vacuously true. Intuitively, there
just aren’t enough “impossible” worlds in this case; the set of conceivable worlds is
not independent of the model. To deal with this problem, we focus attention on one
particular model, the canonical model, which intuitively has “enough” worlds. Its
worlds consist of all the maximal consistent subsets of basic formulas. (Recall that
maximal consistent sets were defined in the proof of Theorem 2.3.) Thus, in some
sense, the canonical model has as many worlds as possible.
Definition 3.1 The canonical model (for K45n) M
c = (W c, pic,Kc1, . . . ,K
c
n) is de-
fined as follows:
• W c = {w | w is a maximal consistent set of basic formulas with respect to K45n},
• for all primitive propositions p and w ∈ W c, pi(w)(p) = true iff p ∈ w,
• (w,w′) ∈ Kci iff w/Li ⊆ w
′, where w/Li = {α | Liα ∈ w}.
Validity in the canonical-model approach is defined with respect to the canonical
model only. More precisely, a formula α is said to be valid in the canonical-model
approach, denoted |=c α, iff M c|=α, that is, if for all worlds w in the canonical model
we have (M c, w)|=α.
We clearly cannot use the canonical model in a practical way. It can be shown
that it has uncountably many worlds. Each of its worlds is characterized by an infinite
set of formulas, so cannot be described easily. Moreover, in general, both Kci (w) and
W c −Kci (w) are infinite, so we cannot compute whether Liϕ or Niϕ holds at a given
world. Thus, our interest in the canonical model is mainly to understand whether it
gives reasonable semantics to the Ni operator.
We start by arguing that, for an appropriate notion of “possibility” and “conceiv-
ability”, this semantics satisfies the first two of Levesque’s properties. What then is
a conceivable world? Intuitively, it is an objective state of affairs from agent i’s point
of view, which does not include i’s beliefs. In the single-agent case, this is simply a
truth assignment. In the multi-agent case, things are more complicated, since beliefs
of other agents are also part of i’s objective world. One way of characterizing a state
of affairs from i’s point of view is by the set of i-objective formulas that are true at
a particular world. For technical reasons, in this section we restrict even further to
the i-objective basic formulas—that is, those formulas that do not mention any of the
modal operators Nj, j = 1, . . . , n—that are true. If we assume that the basic formulas
determine all the other formulas, which can be shown to be true in the single-agent
case, and under this semantics for the multi-agent case, then it is arguably reasonable
to restrict to basic formulas. However, as we shall see in Section 4, it is not clear that
this restriction is appropriate, although we make it for now.
Definition 3.2 Given a situation (M,w), let obji(M,w) consist of all the i-objective
basic formulas that are true at (M,w). let Obji(M,w) = {obji(M,w
′) | w′ ∈ KMi (w)},
and let subji(M,w) = {basic Liα | (M,w)|=Liα} ∪ {basic ¬Liα | (M,w)|6=Liα}.
We take obji(M,w) to be i’s state at (M,w). Notice that obji(M,w) is a maximal
consistent set of i-objective basic formulas. For ease of exposition, we say i-set from
now on rather than “maximal set of i-objective basic formulas”. Thus, the set of
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conceivable states for agent i is the set of all i-sets. Notice that the set of conceivable
states is independent of the model. It is easy to show that this is a generalization of
the single-agent case, since in the single-agent case the i-objective basic formulas are
just the propositional formulas, and an i-set can be identified with a truth assignment.
Obji(M,w) is the set of i-sets that agent i considers possible in situation (M,w);
subji(M,w) characterizes i’s basic beliefs in (M,w). Notice that if α is an i-objective
basic formula, then Liα ∈ subji(M,w) iff α is in every i-set in Obji(M,w).
With these definitions, we can show that the first two of Levesque’s properties
hold in the canonical model. The first property says that at all worlds w′ considered
in evaluating a formula of the form Niϕ at a world w, the set of possible states—that
is, the set {obji(M
c, w′′) | w′′ /∈ Kci (w
′)}—is the same for all w′ ∈ Kci (w). This is easy
to see, since the only worlds w′ we consider are those such that Kci (w
′) = Kci (w). The
second property says that the union of the set of states associated with the worlds
used in computing Liϕ at w and the set of states associated with the worlds used in
computing Niϕ at w should consist of all conceivable states. To show this, we must
show that for every world w in the canonical model, the set {obji(M
c, w′) | w′ ≈i w}
consists of all i-sets.
To prove this, we need two preliminary lemmas.
Lemma 3.3 Let w and w′ be worlds in M c. Then w ≈i w′ iff agent i has the same
basic beliefs at w and w′, that is, subji(M
c, w) = subji(M
c, w′).
Proof The “only if” direction is immediate because w and w′ are assumed to have
the sameKi-accessible worlds. To prove the “if” direction, suppose that subji(M
c, w) =
subji(M
c, w′) but w 6≈i w′. Without loss of generality, there is a world w∗ ∈
Kci (w) − K
c
i (w
′). By the definition of the canonical model, there must be a basic
formula Liα ∈ w
′ such that α 6∈ w∗. By assumption, Liα ∈ w, contradicting the
assumption that w∗ ∈ Kci (w).
Lemma 3.4 Suppose Γ consists only of i-objective basic formulas, Σ consists only
of i-subjective basic formulas, and Γ and Σ are both K45n-consistent. Then Γ ∪Σ is
K45n-consistent.
Proof This follows immediately from part (c) of Proposition 4.2 below.
We can now prove that the set of conceivable states for agent i is the same at all
worlds of the canonical model. This follows from the following result.
Theorem 3.5 Let w ∈ W c. Then for every i-set Γ there is exactly one world w∗
such that obji(M
c, w∗) = Γ and w ≈i w∗.
Proof Let Σ = subji(M
c, w). Since Γ consists of i-objective basic formulas only, Σ
consists of i-subjective formulas, and Γ and Σ are both K45n-consistent, by Lemma 3.4,
Γ ∪ Σ is K45n-consistent. Let w∗ be a maximal consistent set that contains Γ ∪ Σ.
Since w and w∗ agree on Σ, w ≈i w∗ by Lemma 3.3. The uniqueness of w∗ follows
by a simple induction argument.
10
What about the third property? This says that every subset of i-sets arises as the
set of i-sets associated with the worlds that i considers possible in some situation;
that is, for every set S of i-sets, there should be some situation (M c, w) such that S =
Obji(M
c, w). As we now show, this property does not hold in the canonical model.
We do this by showing that the set of i-sets associated with the worlds considered
possible in any situation in the canonical model all have a particular property we call
limit closure.8
Definition 3.6 We say that an i-set Γ is a limit of a set S of i-sets if, for every finite
subset ∆ of Γ, there is a set Γ′ ∈ S such that ∆ ⊂ Γ′. A set S of i-sets is limit closed
if every limit of S is in S.
Lemma 3.7 For every world w in M c, the set Obji(M
c, w) is limit closed.
Proof Let w be a world in the canonical model and let Γ be an i-set which is a limit
ofObji(M
c, w). We want to show that Γ ∈ Obji(M
c, w). Let Σ = {basic β | Liβ ∈ w}.
We claim that Γ∪Σ is K45n-consistent. For suppose not. Then there must be a finite
subset ∆ ⊆ Γ such that ∆∪Σ is inconsistent. Since Γ is a limit of Obji(M
c, w), there
must be some world w′ in Obji(M
c, w) such that (M c, w′) |= ∆. By construction of
the canonical model, since w′ ∈ Kci (w), we must have that (M
c, w′) |= Σ. Thus ∆∪Σ
is consistent, contradicting our assumption.
Since Γ ∪ Σ is consistent, there is a world w∗ in the canonical model such that
(M c, w∗) |= Γ ∪ Σ. Clearly Γ = obji(M
c, w∗). Moreover, by construction, we must
have w∗ ∈ Kci (w). Thus, Γ ∈ Obji(M
c, w), as desired.
Since there are clearly sets of i-sets that are not limit closed, it follows that this
semantics does not satisfy the third property. One consequence of this is a result
already proved in [12], which we reprove here, using an approach that will be useful
for later results.
Proposition 3.8 [12] If p ∈ Φ and i 6= j, then |=c ¬Oi¬Ojp.
Proof We proceed by contradiction. Our goal is to show that if (M c, w) |= Oi¬Ojp,
then the set Obji(M
c, w) must contain a set that includes Ojp, for otherwise it would
not be limit closed. It follows that there is some world v ∈ Kci (w) such that (M
c, v) |=
Ojp, contradicting the assumption that (M
c, w) |= Li¬Ojp.
We first need a definition and a lemma. We say that a basic formula ψ is (K45)-
independent of a basic formula ϕ if neither ⊢K45n ϕ⇒ ψ nor ⊢K45n ϕ⇒ ¬ψ hold.
Lemma 3.9 If n ≥ 2 (i.e., there are at least two agents) and ϕ1, . . . , ϕm are consistent
basic i-objective formulas, then there exists a basic i-objective formula ψ of the form
Ljψ
′ which is independent of each of ϕ1, . . . , ϕm.
Proof Define the depth of a basic formula ϕ, denoted d(ϕ), inductively:
8This turns out to be closely related to the limit closure property discussed in [3]; a detailed
comparison would take us too far afield here though.
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• d(p) = 0 for a primitive proposition p,
• d(ϕ ∧ ψ) = max(d(ϕ), d(ψ)),
• d(¬ϕ) = d(ϕ),
• d(Liϕ) = 1 + d(ϕ).
Suppose that ϕ1, . . . , ϕm are i-objective formulas such that max(d(ϕ1(, . . . , d(ϕk)) =
K. Let p be an arbitrary primitive proposition, and suppose j 6= i. (Such a j exists,
since we are assuming n ≥ 2.) Let ψ be the formula (LjLi)K+1p, where by (LjLi)K+1
we mean K + 1 occurrences of LjLi. Standard model theoretic arguments show that
ψ is independent of ϕ1, . . . , ϕm. Very briefly: By results of [9], we know that ϕi is
satisfiable in a treelike structure of depth at most d(ϕi), for i = 1, . . . ,m. It is easy
to see that this can be extended to two structures, one of which satisfies ψ, and the
other of which satisfies ¬ψ. Hence, ψ is independent of ϕi.
Continuing with the proof of Proposition 3.8, suppose by way of contradiction
that (M c, w) |= Oi¬Ojp. Let w be a world such that (M c, w)|=Ojp and let Γ =
obji(M
c, w). We claim that Γ is a limit of Obji(M
c, w). To see this, consider any
finite subset ∆ of Γ. Let ψ be an i-objective basic formula of the form Ljψ
′ which
is independent both of the conjunction of the formulas in ∆ and of p. The existence
of such a formula follows from Lemma 3.9. Let Σ = subji(M
c, w). By Lemma 3.4,
Σ∪∆∪{Ljψ′} is consistent. Thus, there is some world w′ ∈W c such that (M c, w′) |=
Σ ∪∆ ∪ {Ljψ′}. By Lemma 3.4 again, there is some world w′′ satisfying p ∧ ¬Ljψ′
such that w′′ ≈i w′. Since (M c, w′) |= Ljψ′, we cannot have w′′ ∈ Kcj(w
′). It follows
that (M c, w′) |= ¬Nj¬p, and hence (M c, w′) |= ¬Ojp. Moreover, since w′ and w
agree on all i-subjective formulas, the canonical model construction guarantees that
w′ ≈i w. Since (M c, w) |= Oi¬Ojp , (M c, w′) |= ¬Ojp, and w′ ≈i w, we must have
that w′ ∈ Kci (w). Thus, obji(M
c, w′) ∈ Obji(M
c, w). Moreover, by construction,
∆ ⊆ obji(M
c, w′). Since ∆ was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that Γ is a limit of
Obji(M
c, w). By Lemma 3.7, Γ ∈ Obji(M
c, w). Thus, there is some world v ∈ Kci (w)
such that obji(M
c, v) = Γ. It is a simple property of the canonical-model approach
that two worlds that agree on all basic beliefs of an agent also agree on what the
agent only believes. Hence, since w and v agree on j’s basic beliefs, it follows that
(M c, v)|=Ojp, contradicting the assumption that (M c, w)|=Oi¬Ojp.
It may seem unreasonable that ¬Oi¬Ojp should be valid in the canonical-model
approach. Why should it be impossible for i to know only that j does not only know
p? After all, j can (truthfully) tell i that it is not the case that all he (j) knows is p.
We return to this issue in Sections 4 and 5. For now, we focus on a proof theory for
this semantics.
3.1 A Proof Theory
We now consider an axiomatization for the language. The following axiomatization is
exactly like Levesque’s except that axiom A5 now requires K45n-consistency instead
of merely propositional consistency. For ease of exposition, we use the same names
for the axioms as we did in the single-agent case with a subscript n to emphasize that
we are looking at the multi-agent version.
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Axioms:
A1n. Axioms of propositional logic.
A2n. Li(α⇒ β)⇒ (Liα⇒ Liβ).
A3n. Ni(α⇒ β)⇒ (Niα⇒ Niβ).
A4n. σ ⇒ Liσ ∧Niσ if σ is an i-subjective formula.
A5n. Niα⇒ ¬Liα if ¬α is a K45n-consistent i-objective basic formula.
Inference Rules:
MPn. From α and α⇒ β infer β.
Necn. From α infer Liα and Niα.
Notice that A5n assumes that α ranges only over basic i-objective formulas. We need
this restriction in order to appeal to satisfiability in the existing logic K45n.
9 To get
a more general version of A5n, that applies to arbitrary formulas, we will need to
appeal to consistency within the logic that the axioms are meant to characterize. We
return to this issue in Section 5. It is not hard to show that these axioms are sound.
Theorem 3.10 [12] For all α in ONLn, if ⊢α then |=
c α.
Proof The proof proceeds by the usual induction on the length of a derivation. Here
we show only the soundness of A5n. Suppose α is a basic i-objective formula such
that ¬α is K45n-consistent. Thus, there is an i-set containing ¬α. By Theorem 3.5, it
follows that for each world w ∈W c, there is a world w′ ≈i w such that (M c, w′) |= ¬α.
If w′ ∈ Kci (w), it follows that (M
c, w) |= ¬Liα. If w′ /∈ Kci (w), then (M
c, w) |= ¬Niα.
Thus, (M c, w) |= ¬Liα∨¬Niα; equivalently, (M c, w) |= Niα⇒ ¬Liα. It follows that
|= Niα⇒ ¬Liα.
We show in Section 4 that this axiomatization is incomplete. In fact, the formula
¬Oi¬Ojp is not provable. Intuitively, part of the problem here is thatA5n is restricted
to basic formulas. For completeness, we would need an analogue of A5n for arbitrary
formulas. However, we obtain completeness for a restricted language, which we call
ONL−n . Roughly, the restriction amounts to limiting what an agent can only know.
In particular, only knowing can only be applied to basic formulas.
Definition 3.11 ONL−n consists of all formulas α in ONLn such that, in α, no Nj
may occur within the scope of an Ni or Li for i 6= j.
For example, NiLi¬Nip and Ni(Ljp∨Ni¬p) are in ONL
−
n , and NiNjp and NiLjNip
are not, for distinct i and j. Note that formulas such as Oi¬Ojp cannot be expressed
in ONL−n .
To prove completeness for the sublanguage ONL−n , we need four preliminary
lemmas. The first describes a normal form for formulas. Having such a normal form
greatly simplifies the completeness proof.
9Note that this peculiar axiom schema is recursive since satisfiability in propositional K45n is
decidable [9].
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Lemma 3.12 Every formula α in ONLn is provably equivalent to a disjunction of
formulas of the following form:
σ ∧ L1ϕ10 ∧ ¬L1ϕ11 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬L1ϕ1m1 ∧ . . . ∧ Lnϕn0 ∧ ¬Lnϕn1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬Lnϕnmn∧
N1ψ10 ∧ ¬N1ψ11 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬N1ψ1k1 ∧ . . . ∧Nnψn0 ∧ ¬Nnψn1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬Nnψnkn ,
where σ is a propositional formula and ϕij and ψij are all i-objective formulas. More-
over, if α in ONL−n , we can assume that ϕij and ψij are i-objective basic formulas.
Proof We proceed by induction on the structure of ϕ. The only nontrivial cases are
if ϕ is of the form Liϕ
′ or Niϕ
′. If ϕ is of the form Liϕ
′, then, since ϕ ∈ ONL−n , Nj
does not appear in ϕ′ for j 6= i. We use the inductive hypothesis to get ϕ′ into the
normal form described in the lemma. Notice that Nj does not appear in the normal
form for j 6= i. We now use the the following equivalences to get Liϕ′ into the normal
form:
• Li(ψ ∧ ψ′)⇔ (Liψ ∧ Liψ′)
• Li(ψ ∨ Liψ′)⇔ (Liψ ∨ Liψ′)
• Li(ψ ∨ ¬Liψ′)⇔ (Liψ ∨ ¬Liψ′)
• LiLiψ ⇔ Liψ
• (¬Lifalse ∧ Li¬Liψ)⇔ ¬Liψ
• LiNiψ ⇔ Niψ
• Li¬Niψ ⇔ ¬Niψ.
The first five of these equivalences are standard K45n properties; the last two are
instances of axiom A4n. Similar arguments work in the case that ϕ is of the form
Niϕ
′. We leave the straightforward details to the reader.
The next two lemmas give us some basic facts about the satisfiability and validity
of formulas in ONL−n .
Lemma 3.13 If Sj is a set of consistent j-sets, j = 1, . . . , n, and σ is a consistent
propositional formula, then there is a K45n situation (M,w) such that (M,w) |= σ
and Objj(M,w) = Sj.
Proof This follows immediately from part (b) of Proposition 4.2 below.
Lemma 3.14 If ϕ and ψ are i-objective basic formulas such that Liϕ ∧Niψ is con-
sistent, then ϕ ∨ ψ is valid.
Proof Suppose that ¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ is consistent. Then, by Axiom A5n, Ni(ϕ ∨ ψ) ⇒
¬Li(ϕ ∨ ψ) is provable. It follows that Niψ ⇒ ¬Liϕ is provable, contradicting the
consistency of Liϕ ∧Niψ.
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The last lemma gives us a sharper condition on when w′ /∈ Kci (w). This condition
will prove useful in the completeness proof.
Lemma 3.15 If w,w′ are worlds in the canonical model such that w ≈i w′ and
w′ /∈ Kci (w), then there is an i-objective basic formula ϕ such that Liϕ ∈ w and
ϕ /∈ w′.
Proof By the construction of the canonical model, we know that if w′ /∈ Kci (w),
then there is some basic formula ϕ such that Liϕ ∈ w and ϕ /∈ w′. From Lemma 3.12,
it follows that we can assume without loss of generality that ϕ is in the normal
form described by that lemma. Let A consist of all subformulas of ϕ that are of
the form Liψ and do not appear in the scope of any other modal operator. Let
ϕA be
∧
ψ∈A∩w ψ ∧
∧
ψ∈A−w ¬ψ. It is easy to see that ϕA ∈ w (since each of its
conjuncts is). Since w ≈i w′, it follows that ϕA ∈ w′. Let ϕ′ be the result of replacing
each subformula Liψ of ϕ that is in A by either true or false, depending on whether
Liψ ∈ w. By construction, ϕ
′ is i-objective. It is easy to see that ϕA ⇒ (ϕ ⇔ ϕ
′)
is provable. It follows that ϕ′ /∈ w′. It also follows that LiϕA ⇒ (Liϕ ⇔ Liϕ′)
is provable. Since ϕA is an i-subjective formula, ϕA ⇒ LiϕA is provable. Hence,
LiϕA ∈ w. Since Liϕ ∈ w, it follows that Liϕ′ ∈ w. This gives us the desired result.
We are finally ready to prove the completeness result.
Theorem 3.16 [12] For all α ∈ ONL−n , if |=
c α then ⊢α.
Proof As usual, it suffices to show that if the formula α ∈ ONL−n is consistent, then
it is satisfiable in the canonical model. Without loss of generality, we can assume
that α is in the normal form described in Lemma 3.12:
σ ∧ L1ϕ10 ∧ ¬L1ϕ11 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬L1ϕ1m1 ∧ . . . ∧ Lnϕn0 ∧ ¬Lnϕn1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬Lnϕnmn∧
N1ψ10 ∧ ¬N1ψ11 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬N1ψ1k1 ∧ . . . ∧Nnψn0 ∧ ¬Nnψn1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬Nnψnkn .
Moreover, since α ∈ ONL−n , we can assume that ϕij and ψij are i-objective basic
formulas. Let Ai consist of all the consistent formulas of the form ϕi0 ∧ψi0 ∧¬ϕij or
ϕi0 ∧ ψi0 ∧ ¬ψij , j ≥ 1. Let ξi be a formula that is independent of all the formulas
in Ai; such a formula exists by Lemma 3.9. Let Si consist of all i-sets containing
ϕi0 ∧ (¬ψi0 ∨ (ψi0 ∧ ξi)). By Lemma 3.13, there is a K45n structure (M,w) such
that Obji(M,w) = Si, i = 1, . . . , n, and (M,w) |= σ. Thus, there must be a world
w∗ in the canonical model such that w∗ = {basic ϕ′ | (M,w) |= ϕ′}. We claim that
(M c, w∗) |= α.
To see this, let α′ be the formula σ∧L1ϕ10∧¬L1ϕ11∧. . .∧¬L1ϕ1m1∧. . .∧Lnϕn0∧
¬Lnϕn1 ∧ . . .∧¬Lnϕnmn . We first show that (M,w) |= α
′. By construction, we have
that (M,w) |= σ. Furthermore, by definition, each world w′ ∈ KMi (w) satisfies ϕi0,
so we have that (M,w) |= Liϕi0. Since Liϕi0 ∧ ¬Liϕij is consistent for each j ≥ 1,
it must be the case that ϕi0 ∧ ¬ϕij is consistent. Thus, one of ϕi0 ∧ ¬ψi0 ∧ ¬ϕij
or ϕi0 ∧ ψi0 ∧ ¬ϕij is consistent. If the latter is consistent, then by the choice of ξ,
ϕi0∧ψi0∧ξi∧¬ϕij must be consistent as well. Since Si consists of all i-sets containing
ϕi0 ∧ (¬ψi0 ∨ (ψi0 ∧ ξi)), it follows that there must be an i-set in Si containing ¬ϕij .
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It follows that (M,w) |= ¬Liϕij , for j ≥ 1. Thus, we have shown that (M,w) |= α′.
Since (M,w) and (M c, w∗) agree on basic formulas, it follows that (M c, w∗) |= α′.
Next, we show that (M c, w∗) |= N1ψ10 ∧ . . . ∧ Nnψn0. To this end, suppose
that w′ ≈i w∗ and w′ /∈ Kci (w
∗). By Lemma 3.15, there must be some i-objective
basic formula ϕ′ such that Liϕ
′ ∈ w∗ and ¬ϕ′ ∈ w′. Since Liϕ′ ∈ w∗, it follows that
(M,w) |= Liϕ′, and hence ϕ′ is in every i-set in Si. It follows that obji(w
′) /∈ Si. Now,
one of the following four formulas must be in obji(w
′): (1) ϕi0 ∧ ψi0, (2) ϕi0 ∧ ¬ψi0,
(3) ¬ϕi0 ∧ ψi0, (4) ¬ϕi0 ∧ ¬ψi0. Since Liϕi0 ∧Niψi0 is consistent, it cannot be (4),
by Lemma 3.14. It cannot be (2), for otherwise w′ would be in Si. Thus, it must
be (1) or (3), so ψi0 ∈ obji(w
′). Since this is true for all w′ such that w′ ≈i w∗ and
w′ /∈ Kci (w
∗), it follows that (M c, w∗) |= Niψi0, for i = 1, . . . , n.
Finally, we must show that (M∗, w∗) |= ¬N1ψij , for i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . , ki.
Clearly ψi0 ∧ ¬ψij is consistent, for otherwise Niψi0 ∧ ¬Niψij would be inconsistent.
Thus, at least one of (1) ψi0 ∧ ¬ψij ∧ ¬ϕi0 or (2) ψi0 ∧ ¬ψij ∧ ϕi0 is consistent. In
case (2), by choice of ξi, the formula ψi0 ∧ ¬ψij ∧ ϕi0 ∧ ¬ξi is consistent. Let β
be ψi0 ∧ ¬ψij ∧ ¬ϕi0 if it is consistent, and ψi0 ∧ ¬ψij ∧ ϕi0 ∧ ¬ξi otherwise. By
construction, β is consistent. By Lemma 3.4, there is a situation (M ′, v) such that
subji(M
′, v) = subji(M
∗, w∗) and (M ′, v) |= β. There is a world w′′ in the canonical
model which agrees with (M ′, v) on the basic formulas. By construction, we have
w′′ ≈i w∗. Moreover, since (M c, w) |= Li(ϕi0 ∧ (¬ψi0 ∨ (ψi0 ∧ ξ))), it follows that
(M c, w∗) |= Li¬β. Since (M c, w′) |= β, we have that w′ /∈ Kci (w
∗). Moreover, since
(M c, w′) |= ¬ψij , it follows that (M
c, w∗) |= ¬Niψij , as desired. This completes the
proof.
3.2 Discussion
As we have shown, the canonical-model semantics for Ni has some attractive features,
in particular when restricted to the language ONL−n . It is for this sublanguage that
we have a nice proof-theoretic characterization. There is some evidence, however, that
the semantics may not have the behavior we desire when we move beyond ONL−n . For
one thing, the formula ¬Oi¬Ojp is valid in the canonical model: it is impossible that
all i knows is that it is not the case that all j knows is p. While it is certainly consistent
for ¬Oi¬Ojp to hold, it seems reasonable to have a semantics that allowsOi¬Ojp to be
hold as well. As we have seen, the validity of ¬Oi¬Ojp follows from the fact that the
canonical-model semantics does not have the third property of Levesque’s semantics
in the single-agent case: not all subsets of conceivable states are possible. In the
next section, we discuss a different approach to giving semantics to only knowing—
essentially that taken in [5]—that has all three of Levesque’s properties, at least
as long as we continue to represent an agent’s objective state of affairs using basic
formulas only. The approach agrees with the canonical-model approach on formulas
in ONL−n , but makes Oi¬Ojp satisfiable. Unfortunately, as we shall see, it too suffers
from problems.
4 The i-Set Approach
In the i-set approach, we maintain the intuition that the set of conceivable states for
each agent i can be identified with the set of i-sets. We no longer restrict attention
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to the canonical model though; we consider all Kripke structures.
We define a new semantics |=′ as follows: all the clauses of |=′ are identical to the
corresponding clauses for |=, except that for Ni. In this case, we have
(M,w) |=′ Niϕ iff (M ′, w′) |=′ ϕ for all situations (M ′, w′) such that
Obji(M,w) = Obji(M
′, w′) and obji(M
′, w′) /∈ Obji(M,w).
Notice that |= and |=′ agree for basic formulas; in general, as we shall see, they differ.
We remark that this definition is equivalent to the one given in [5], except that there,
rather than i-sets, i-objective trees were considered. We did not want to go through
the overhead of introducing i-objective trees here, since it follows from results in
[5, 6] that i-sets are equivalent to i-objective trees: every i-set uniquely determines
an i-objective tree and vice versa.
How well does this approach fare in terms of computing the truth of a formula at a
given world. Since we now allow arbitrary structures, not just the canonical model, it
seems that for computational reasons, it seems we ought to focus on finite structures.
However, when it comes to formulas of the formNiα, where α is i-objective, satisfiable
formula, it can be shown that (M,w) |=′ ¬Niα. There are simply too few sets in
Obji(M,w) if M is finite to have ¬α hold in all “impossible” situations. This means
that to really model interesting situations with only knowing, we must use infinite
models, and we are back to the problems discussed in the case of the canonical model.
Thus, again we focus on whether this approach gives reasonable semantics to the Ni
operator.
Notice that to decide if Niϕ holds in (M,w), we consider all situations that agree
with (M,w) on the set of possible states, hence this semantics satisfies the first of
the three properties we isolated in the single-agent case. It is also clear that the
i-sets considered in evaluating the truth of Niϕ are precisely those not considered in
evaluating the truth of Liϕ; hence we satisfy the second property. Finally, as we now
show, for every set S of i-sets, there is a situation (M,w) such that Obji(M,w) = S.
In fact, we prove an even stronger result.
Definition 4.1 Let ob+i (M,w) consist of all i-objective formulas (not necessarily
just i-objective basic formulas) true at (M,w) (with respect to |=′) and letOb+i (M,w)
= {ob+i (M,w
′) | w′ ∈ KMi (w)}.
Proposition 4.2 Let Γ be a satisfiable set of i-objective formulas, let Si be a set of
maximal satisfiable sets of i-objective formulas, i = 1, . . . , n, let Σ be a satisfiable set
of i-subjective formulas, and let σ be a satisfiable propositional formula. Then
(a) there exists a situation (M1, w1) such that Γ ⊆ ob
+
i (M1, w1) and Si = Ob
+
i (M1, w1).
(b) there exists a situation (M2, w2) such that (M2, w2) |= σ and Ob
+
j (M2, w2) =
Sj, j = 1, . . . , n.
(c) there exists a situation (M3, w3) such that (M3, w3) |= Γ ∧ Σ.
Proof For part (a), we first show that, given an arbitrary situation (M,w), we can
construct a situation (M∗, w∗) such that ob+i (M
∗, w∗) = ob+i (M,w) and there are
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no worlds i-accessible from w∗. The idea is to have M∗ be the result of adding w∗
to the worlds in M , where w∗ is just like w except that it has no i-accessible worlds
and w∗ is not accessible from any world. More formally, if M = (W,pi,K1, . . . ,Kn),
we take M∗ = (W ∗, pi∗,K∗1, . . . ,K
∗
n), where W
∗ = W ∪ {w∗}, pi∗(w′) = pi(w′) for
w′ ∈ W , pi∗(w∗) = pi(w), K∗j = Kj ∪ {(w
∗, w′) | w′ ∈ Kj(w)} for j 6= i, and K∗i = Ki.
It is easy to see that K∗j is Euclidean and transitive. By construction, there are no
worlds i-accessible from w∗ and (w′, w∗) /∈ K∗j for all w
′ and all j. Moreover, if ψ is
an i-objective formula, we have (M∗, w∗) |=′ ψ iff (M,w) |=′ ψ, since for j 6= i, we
have Kj(w∗) = Kj(w). In particular, this means that ob
+
i (M
∗, w∗) = ob+i (M,w).
For each ∆ ∈ S′ = Si ∪ {Γ}, there is a situation (M∆, w∆) |=′ ∆, where
M∆ = (W∆, pi∆,K∆1 , . . . ,K
∆
n ). By the argument above, we can assume without
loss of generality that there are no worlds i-accessible from w∆ and w∆ is not ac-
cessible from any world. We define M1 = (W,pi,K1, . . . ,Kn) by taking W to be the
union of all the worlds in W∆, ∆ ∈ S′. (We can assume without loss of general-
ity that these are disjoint sets of worlds.) We define pi so that pi|W∆ = pi
∆. We
define Kj = ∪∆∈S′K∆j for j 6= i, and Ki to be the least transitive, Euclidean set
containing ∪∆∈S′K∆i ∪ {(w
Γ, w∆) | ∆ ∈ S}. It is easy to check that ob+i (M1, w
∆) =
ob+i (M
∆, w∆) (although this depends on the fact that w∆ is not j-accessible from
any world for j 6= i). Thus, Ob+i (M1, w
Γ) = Si and ob
+
i (M1, w
Γ) ⊇ Γ. Thus, we can
take w1 = w
Γ, completing the proof of part (a).
To summarize the construction of part (a), we start with an arbitrary situation
(M,w) satisfying Γ, convert it to a situation satisfying Lifalse ∧ Γ, essentially by
modifying the i-accessibility relation at w so that there are no worlds i-accessible from
w and w is not accessible from any world, and then again modifying the i-accessibility
relation at w so that we get a structure (M1, w1) such that Ob
+
i (Mi, wi) = Si. Note
that in doing this construction, we did not change the propositional formulas true
at w, nor did we change the worlds that were j-accessible from w for j 6= i. Thus,
starting with a situation that satisfies a propositional formula σ, we can repeat this
construction for each i in turn, for i = 1, . . . , n. The resulting situation is (M2, w2),
and it clearly has the desired properties. This proves part (b).
For part (c), suppose (M ′, w′) |= Σ; let Ob+i (M
′, w′) = Si. By part (a), there
is a situation (M3, w3) such that Ob
+
i (M3, w3) = Si and (M3, w3) |= Γ. Since the
set of subjective formulas true at a situation (M,w) is completely determined by
Ob+i (M,w), and Ob
+
i (M
′, w′) = Ob+i (M3, w3), it follows that (M3, w3) |= Σ as
well.
How does this semantics compare to the canonical model semantics? First of all,
it is easy to see that the axioms are sound. We write |=′ ϕ if (M,w) |=′ ϕ for every
situation (M,w). Then we have the following result.
Theorem 4.3 [5] For all α ∈ ONLn, if ⊢ α then |=′ α.
Proof As usual, the proof is by induction on the length of a derivation. All that
needs to be done is to show that all the axioms are sound. Again, this is straightfor-
ward. The proof in the case ofA5n proceeds just as that in the proof of Theorem 3.10,
using the fact that this semantics satisfies Levesque’s second property.
Moreover, we again get completeness for the sublanguage ONL−n .
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Theorem 4.4 [5] For all α ∈ ONL−n , ⊢ α iff |=
′ α.
Proof As usual, it suffices to show that if α is consistent with the axioms, then α is
satisfiable under the |=′ semantics. From Theorem 3.16, we know that α is satisfiable
in the canonical model under the |= semantics. Thus, it suffices to show that for
all formulas α ∈ ONL−n , we have (M
c, w) |= α iff (M c, w) |=′ α. By Lemma 3.12,
it suffices to consider formulas α in normal form. We proceed by induction on the
structure of formulas. The only nontrivial case obtains if α is of the form Niα
′. Since
α is in normal form, we can assume that α′ is basic. Suppose (M c, w) |=′ Niα′.
To show that (M c, w) |= Niα
′, we must show that if w′ ≈i w and w
′ /∈ Kci (w),
then (M c, w′) |= α. By definition, if w′ ≈i w, then Obji(M
c, w′) = Obji(M
c, w).
Moreover, we must have obji(M
c, w′) /∈ Obji(M
c, w), for otherwise we would have
w′ ∈ Kci (w). Hence, we must have (M
c, w′) |=′ α′. By the induction hypothesis, we
have (M c, w′) |= α′. Thus, (M c, w) |= Niα′, as desired.
For the converse, suppose that (M c, w) |= Niα′. We want to show that (M c, w) |=′
Niα
′. Suppose that (M ′, w′) is such thatObji(M
′, w′) = Obji(M
c, w) and obji(M
′, w′) /∈
Obji(M
c, w). We must show that (M ′, w′) |=′ α. It is easy to see that for every sit-
uation (M,w) and basic formula ϕ, we have that (M,w) |= Liϕ iff (M,w) |=
′ Liϕ iff
ϕ is in every set in Obji(M,w). Thus, it follows that subji(M
′, w′) = subji(M
c, w).
There must be a world w′′ in M c such that (M c, w′′) agrees with (M ′, w′) on all
basic formulas according to the |= semantics. Since subji(M
c, w′′) = subji(M
c, w),
it follows from Lemma 3.3 that w ≈i w′′. Since obji(M
′, w′) /∈ Obji(M
c, w) and
obji(M
′, w′) = obji(M
c, w′′), it follows that w′′ /∈ Kci (w). Since (M
c, w) |= Niα′, we
must have that (M c, w′′) |= α′. And since (M c, w′′) and (M ′, w′) agree on basic for-
mulas, it follows that (M ′, w′) |= α′. Finally, since |= and |=′ agree for basic formulas,
we have (M ′, w′) |=′ α′. This completes the proof that (M,w) |= Niα
′.
Although our axiomatization is complete for ONL−n , as we now show, it is not
complete for the full language, for neither |= nor |=′. Since the axiomatization is sound
for both |= and |=′, to prove incompleteness, it suffices to provide a formula which
is satisfiable with respect to |=′ and not |=, and another formula which is satisfiable
with respect to |= and not |=′. As is shown in Proposition 4.5, Oi¬Ojp is satisfiable
with respect to |=′ and (by Proposition 3.8) not with respect to |=. On the other
hand, it is easy to see that Ljfalse ∧Nj¬Oi¬Ojp is satisfiable with respect to |= (in
fact, it is equivalent to Ljfalse); as shown in Proposition 4.6, it is not satisfiable with
respect to |=′.
Proposition 4.5 Oi¬Ojp is satisfiable under the |=′ semantics.
Proof Let S = {ob+i (M,w) | (M,w) |=
′ ¬Ojp}. By Proposition 4.2, there is a sit-
uation (M∗, w∗) such that Ob+i (M
∗, w∗) = S. We claim that (M∗, w∗) |=′ Oi¬Ojp.
Clearly (M∗, w∗) |=′ Li¬Ojp, since ¬Ojp is true at all worlds i-accessible from
w∗. To see that (M∗, w∗) |=′ NiOjp, suppose that Obji(M,w) = Obji(M
∗, w∗)
and obji(M,w) /∈ Obji(M
∗, w∗). We want to show that (M,w) |=′ Ojp. Sup-
pose that (M,w) |=′ ¬Ojp. By definition, ob
+
i (M,w) ∈ S, so there is some world
w′ ∈ KM
∗
i (w
∗) such that ob+i (M
∗, w′) = ob+i (M,w). In particular, this means that
obji(M
∗, w′) = obji(M,w). But this contradicts the assumption that obji(M,w) /∈
Obji(M
∗, w∗). Thus, (M,w) |= Ojp as desired, and (M∗, w∗) |= Oi¬Ojp.
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Proposition 4.6 There is a formula β such that |=′ β but ¬β is satisfiable under the
|= semantics.
Proof We first show that if ϕ is an i-objective formula that is satisfiable under the |=′
semantics, then |=′ Lifalse⇒ ¬Ni¬ϕ. For suppose that ϕ is satisfiable in a situation
(M,w). By Proposition 4.2, there is a situation (M∗, w∗) such that ob+i (M
∗, w∗) =
ob+i (M,w) and Ob
+
i (M
∗, w∗) = ∅. This means that (M∗, w∗) |=′ ϕ∧Lifalse. Now let
(M ′, w′) be any situation satisfying Lifalse. Then Obji(M
′, w′) = Obji(M
∗, w∗) = ∅,
and obji(M
∗, w∗) /∈ Obji(M
′, w′). It follows that (M ′, w′) |=′ ¬Ni¬ϕ. Thus, we
have shown that |=′ Lifalse ⇒ ¬Ni¬ϕ. Since, as we showed in Proposition 4.5,
the formula Oj¬Oip is satisfiable, this means that |=′ Lifalse ⇒ ¬Ni¬Oj¬Oip. On
the other hand, since Oj¬Oip is not satisfiable with respect to |=, as we showed in
Proposition 3.8, neither is ¬Ni¬Oj¬Oip, and hence Lifalse ⇒ ¬Ni¬Oj¬Oip is not
valid under the |= semantics. Indeed, Lifalse ∧ Ni¬Oj¬Oip is equivalent to Lifalse
under the |= semantics.
We can now show that our axiom system is incomplete for the full language with
respect to both the |= and |=′ semantics.
Theorem 4.7 There exist formulas α and β in ONLn such that 6⊢ α and |= α, and
6⊢ β and |=′ β.
Proof By Propositions 3.8 and 4.5, we have that |= ¬Oj¬Oip, but 6|=′ ¬Oj¬Oip.
Since ⊢ is sound with respect to |=′, we cannot have ⊢ ¬Oj¬Oip (for otherwise we
would have |=′ ¬Oj¬Oip). Thus, we can take α to be ¬Oj¬Oip. A similar argument
shows we can take β to be Lifalse⇒ ¬Ni¬OjOip.
The fact that neither |= nor |=′ is complete with respect to the axiomatization
described earlier is not necessarily bad. We may be able to find a natural complete
axiomatization. However, as we suggested above, the fact that ¬Oj¬Oip is valid under
the |= semantics suggests that this semantics does not quite satisfy our intuitions with
regards to only-knowing for formulas in ONLn −ONL−n . As we now show, |=
′ also
has its problems. We might hope that if ϕ is a satisfiable i-objective formula, then
Niϕ⇒ ¬Liϕ would be valid under the |=′ semantics. Unfortunately, it is not.
Proposition 4.8 The formula Ni¬Ojp ∧ Li¬Ojp is satisfiable under the |=′ seman-
tics.
Proof First we show that for any situation (M,w) that satisfies Ojp, there exists
another situation (M ′, w′) such that (M,w) and (M ′, w′) agree on all basic formulas,
but (M ′, w′) |=′ ¬Ojp. We can construct (M ′, w′) as follows: Choose a particular
set Γ ∈ Objj(M,w). It easily follows from Proposition 4.2 that there is a situation
(M ′, w′) such that Objj(M
′, w′) = Objj(M,w) − {Γ} and objj(M
′, w′) = objj(M,w).
We now show that for any basic formula ϕ, we have (M,w) |=′ ϕ iff (M ′, w′) |=′ ϕ. If
ϕ is a j-objective formula, this is immediate from the construction. Thus, it suffices
to deal with the case that ϕ is of the form Ljϕ
′. By Lemma 3.12, we can assume
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without loss of generality that ϕ′ is j-objective. Suppose that ϕ′ is a consistent j-
objective formula. In this case, it is almost immediate from the definitions that if
(M,w) |=′ Ljϕ
′ then (M ′, w′) |=′ Ljϕ
′. For the converse, suppose that (M,w) |=′
¬Ljϕ′. Then there is some world w′′ ∈ KMj (w) such that (M,w
′′) |= ¬ϕ′. Since
(M,w) |=′ Ljp, we have that (M,w′′) |=′ p ∧ ¬ϕ′. Let ψ be a j-objective basic
formula that is independent of p∧¬ϕ′. Let ϕ′′ be ϕ′ ∧ p∧¬ψ if ψ ∈ Γ, and ϕ′ ∧ p∧ψ
otherwise. Since ψ is independent of p ∧ ¬ϕ′, it follows that ϕ′′ is consistent. Let ∆
be any j-set containing ϕ′′. It must be the case that ∆ ∈ Objj(M,w), for if not, let
(M∗, w∗) be a situation such that Objj(M
∗, w∗) = Objj(M,w) and objj(M
∗, w∗) = ∆
(such a situation exists by Proposition 4.2). Then (M∗, w∗) |= p, contradicting the
assumption that (M,w) |= Nj¬p. By construction, ∆ 6= Γ. Thus, there is some
world v ∈ KM
′
j (w
′) such that objj(M
′, v) = ∆. It follows that (M ′, v) |=′ ¬ϕ′,
so (M ′, w′) |=′ ¬Ljϕ
′. Thus, (M ′, w′) agrees with (M,w) on all basic formulas.
However, since Γ /∈ Objj(M,w), it follows that (M
′, w′) |= ¬Nj¬p, and hence that
(M ′, w′) |= ¬Ojp.
Let S = {ob+i (M,w) | (M,w) |=
′ ¬Ojp}. By Proposition 4.2, there is a situation
(M∗, w∗) such that Ob+i (M
∗, w∗) = S. Clearly (M∗, w∗) |=′ Li¬Ojp. We now show
that (M∗, w∗) |=′ Ni¬Ojp as well. For suppose that (M,w) is a situation such that
Obji(M,w) = Obji(M
∗, w∗) and obji(M,w) /∈ Obji(M
∗, w∗). Moreover, suppose, by
way of contradiction, that (M,w) |=′ Ojp. By the arguments above, it follows that
there is a situation (M ′, w′) such that (M ′, w′) |=′ ¬Ojp and (M,w) and (M
′, w′)
agree on all basic formulas. By construction, ob+i (M
′, w′) ∈ S = Ob+i (M
∗, w∗),
so obji(M
′, w′) ∈ Obji(M
∗, w∗). Since obji(M,w) = obji(M
′, w′), we must also have
obji(M,w) ∈ Obji(M
∗, w∗), contradicting the choice of (M,w). Thus, (M,w) |=
¬Ojp, as desired, and so (M∗, w∗) |= Li¬Ojp ∧Ni¬Ojp.
4.1 Discussion
Proposition 4.8 shows that although the i-set semantics has the three properties we
claimed were appropriate, Ni and Li still do not always interact in what seems to be
the appropriate way. Intuitively, the problem here is that there is more to i’s view of
a world than just the i-objective basic formulas that are true there. We should really
identify i’s view of a situation (M,w) with the set of all i-objective formulas that are
true there. In the canonical-model approach, the i-objective basic formulas that are
true at a world can be shown to determine all the i-objective formulas that are true
at that world. This is not true at all situations under the i-set approach.
Indeed, it is no longer true that the i-set approach has the second of the three
properties once we take i’s view of (M,w) to be ob+i (M,w). For consider the situation
(M∗, w∗) constructed in the proof of Proposition 4.8. As the proof of that lemma
shows, {ob+i (M
∗, w) | w ∈ KM
∗
i (w
∗)}∪{ob+i (M
′, w′) | obji(M
′, w′) /∈ Obji(M
∗, w∗)}
does not include all maximal sets of i-objective formulas. In particular, it does not
include those maximal sets that satisfy Ojp.
To summarize: while the i-set approach arguably has enough worlds, it suffers
from the fact that the full complement of worlds is not always taken into account for
Li and Ni, as the above example shows. While the canonical model approach does
not run into this problem, it suffers from a perhaps more basic deficiency: there just
are not enough worlds to begin with. For example, there is no world where OiOjp is
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true.
We consider a different approach in the next section that attempts to deal with
both problems.
5 What Properties Should Only Knowing Have?
Up to now, we have provided two semantics for only knowing. While both have
properties we view as desirable, they also have properties that seem somewhat un-
desirable. This leads to an obvious question: What properties should only knowing
have? Roughly speaking, we would like to have the multi-agent version of Levesque’s
axioms, and no more. Of course, the problem here is axiom A5n. It is not so clear
what the multi-agent version of that should be. The problem is one of circularity:
We would like to be able to say that Niϕ ⇒ ¬Liϕ should hold for any consistent
i-objective formula. The problem is that in order to say what the consistent formulas
are, we need to define the axiom system. In particular, we have to make precise what
this axiom should be.
To deal with this problem, we extend the language so that we can explicitly talk
about satisfiability and validity in the language. We add a modal operator Val to
the language. The formula Val(ϕ) should be read “ϕ is valid”. Of course, its dual
Sat(ϕ), defined as ¬Val(¬ϕ), should be read “ϕ is satisfiable”. With this operator in
the language, we can replace A5n with
A5′n. Sat(¬α)⇒ (Niα⇒ ¬Liα) if α is i-objective.
In addition, we have the following rules for reasoning about validity and satisfia-
bility:
V1. (Val(ϕ) ∧ Val(ϕ⇒ ψ))⇒ Val(ψ).
V2. Sat(ϕ), if ϕ is a satisfiable propositional formula.10
V3. (Sat(α ∧ β1)∧ . . .∧Sat(α ∧ βk)∧Sat(γ ∧ δ1)∧ . . .∧Sat(γ ∧ δm)∧Val(α ∨ γ))⇒
Sat(Liα ∧ ¬Li¬β1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬Li¬βk ∧Niγ ∧ ¬Ni¬δ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬Ni¬δm),
if α, β1, . . . , βk, γ, δ1, . . . , δm are i-objective formulas.
V4. (Sat(α) ∧ Sat(β))⇒ Sat(α ∧ β) if α is i-objective and β is i-subjective.
NecV . From ϕ infer Val(ϕ).
Axiom V1 and the rule NecV make Val what is called a normal modal operator.
In fact, it can be shown to satisfy all the axioms of S5. The interesting clauses are
clearly V2–V4, which capture the intuitive properties of validity and satisfiability.
If we restrict to basic formulas, thenV3 simplifies to (Sat(α ∧ β1)∧. . .∧Sat(α ∧ βk))⇒
Sat(Liα ∧ ¬Li¬β1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬Li¬βk) (we can take γ, δ1, . . . , δm to be true to get this).
The soundness of this axiom (interpreting Sat as satisfiability) follows using much the
same arguments as those in the proof of Proposition 4.2. The soundness of V4 if we
restrict to basic formulas follows from Lemma 3.4. More interestingly, it follows from
10We can replace this by the simpler Sat(p′
1
∧ . . . ∧ p′
k
), where p′
i
is a literal—either a primitive
proposition or its negation—and p′
1
∧ . . . ∧ p′
k
is consistent.
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the completeness proof given below that these axioms completely characterize satisfi-
ability in K45n; together with the K45n axioms, they provide a sound and complete
language for the language augmented with the Val operator.
Let AX′ consist of the axioms for ONL given earlier together with V1–V4 and
NecV , except that A5n is replaced by A5
′
n. AX
′ is the axiom system that provides
what we claim is the desired generalization of Levesque’s axioms to the multi-agent
case. In particular, A5′n is the appropriate generalization of A5. The question is,
of course, whether there is a semantics for which this is a complete axiomatization.
We now provide one, in the spirit of the canonical-model construction of Section 3,
except that, in the spirit of the extended situations of Section 2, we do not attempt
to make the set of worlds used for evaluating Li and Ni disjoint.
Let ONL+n be the extension of ONLn to include the modal operator Val. For
the remainder of this section, when we say “consistent”, we mean consistent with
the axiom system AX′. We define the extended canonical model, denoted M e =
(W e, pie,Ke1, . . . ,K
e
n,N
e
1 , . . . ,N
e
n), as follows:
• W e consists of the maximal consistent sets of formulas in ONL+n .
• For all primitive propositions p and w ∈ W e, we have pie(w)(p) = true iff p ∈ w.
• (w,w′) ∈ Kei iff w/Li ⊆ w
′.
• (w,w′) ∈ N ei iff w/Ni ⊆ w
′.
In this canonical model, the semantics for Li and Ni is defined in terms of the Kei
and N ei relations, respectively:
(M e, w) |= Liα if (M e, w′) |= α for all w′ such that (w,w′) ∈ Kei .
(M e, w) |= Niα if (M e, w′) |= α for all w′ such that (w,w′) ∈ N ei .
We define the Val operator so that it corresponds to validity in the extended canonical
model:
(M e, w) |= Val(α) if (M e, w′) |= α for all worlds w′ in M e.
We now want to show that every formula in a maximal consistent set is satisfied
at a world in the extended canonical model. To do this, we need one preliminary
result, showing that Val and Sat really correspond to provability and consistency in
this framework.
Proposition 5.1 For every formula ϕ ∈ ONLn, if ϕ is provable then so is Val(ϕ),
while if ϕ is not provable, then ¬Val(ϕ) is provable.
Proof By NecV , it is clear that if ϕ is provable, so is Val(ϕ). Thus, it remains
to show that if ϕ is not provable, then ¬Val(ϕ) is. Using V1, it is easy to see that
¬Val(ϕ) is provably equivalent to Sat(¬ϕ), so it suffices to show that if ϕ is not
provable—i.e., if ¬ϕ is consistent—then Sat(¬ϕ) is provable. We prove by induction
on ϕ that if ϕ is consistent, then Sat(ϕ) is provable.
If ϕ is propositional, the result is immediate from V2. For the general case, we
first use Lemma 3.12 to restrict attention to formulas in the canonical form specified
by the lemma. Using standard modal reasoning (V1 and NecV ) it is easy to show
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that ⊢ Sat(ϕ ∨ ψ) ⇔ (Sat(ϕ) ∨ Sat(ψ)). Thus, it suffices to restrict attention to a
conjunction in the form specified by the lemma. It is easy to see that if the conjunction
is consistent, then each conjunct must be consistent. Using V4, it is easy to see that
we can restrict attention to i-subjective formulas. By applying Lemma 3.12, we can
assume without loss of generality that we are dealing with a consistent formula ϕ
of the form Liα ∧ ¬Li¬β1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬Li¬βk ∧ Niγ ∧ ¬Ni¬δ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬Ni¬δm, where
α, β1, . . . , βk, γ, δ1, . . . , δm are all i-objective. We can also assume that each of α∧βi,
i = 1, . . . , k and γ ∧ δj, j = 1, . . . ,m are consistent, for otherwise we could easily
show that ϕ is not consistent. Finally, we can show that α ∨ γ must be provable, for
if not, by applying A5′n, we can again show that ϕ is not consistent. We now apply
the induction hypothesis to prove the result.
Corollary 5.2 Each formula in ONL+n is provably equivalent to a formula in ONLn.
Proof We proceed by induction on the structure of formulas. The only nontrivial
case is for formulas of the form Val(ϕ). By the induction hypothesis, ϕ is provably
equivalent to a formula ϕ′ ∈ ONLn. By straightforward modal reasoning using V1
and NecV , we can show that Val(ϕ) is provably equivalent to Val(ϕ
′). By Proposi-
tion 5.1, Val(ϕ′) is provably equivalent to either true or false, depending on whether
ϕ′ is provable.
Using standard modal logic techniques, we can now prove the following result.
Theorem 5.3 M e is a K45n structure (that is, Kei and N
e
i are Euclidean and tran-
sitive). Moreover, for each world w ∈W e, we have (M e, w) |= α iff α ∈ w.
Proof We leave it to the reader to check that the definition of Kei guarantees that
M e is a K45n structure. Given Corollary 5.2, which allows us to restrict attention
to α ∈ ONLn, the proof that (M e, w) |= α iff α ∈ w is completely straight forward
and follows the same lines as the usual proofs dealing with canonical models (see, for
example, [2, 9]).
We say that α is e-valid, denoted |=e α, if M e |= α, that is, if (M e, w) |= α for all
worlds w ∈W e. The following result is immediate from Theorem 5.3.
Corollary 5.4 |=e α iff AX ′ ⊢ α.
Thus, AX′ is a sound and complete axiomatization of ONL+n with respect to the |=
e
semantics.
While AX′ is sufficient for our purposes, it comes at the expense of having to
explicitly axiomatize validity as part of the logic itself. While we view the ability to
axiomatize validity and satisfiability within the logic as a feature in our approach,
it is reasonable to ask whether it is really necessary. One of the anonymous referees
suggested to us the following interesting variant, which may avoid this complication,
although at the expense of an infinite number of axiom schemas.
First we define an infinite sequence of languages ONLkn for k = 0, 1, 2 . . .:
• ONL0n= ONL
−
n
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• ONLk+1n = {α | α is a Boolean combination of formulas of ONL
k
n together with
formulas of the form Liα or Niα for α ∈ ONLkn}
Roughly, each language adds another level of nestings of only knowing with varying
agent indices. For example, ONLk+1n contains the formula Oi0Oi1 . . . Oik+1p, where
ij 6= ij+1, something that cannot be expressed in ONLkn.
Let AX∗ consist of the the axioms A1n–A4n as before together with the following
set of axioms
A5k+1n . Niα ⇒ ¬ Liα, where α is an i-objective ONL
k
n formula which is
consistent with respect to A1n–A4n,A5
1
n, A5
2
n,. . . A5
k
n.
It is not hard to show that the axioms are sound with respect to the semantics.
Whether they are also complete remains an open problem.
Apart from the question of axiomatization, how does the |=e semantics compare
to our earlier two? Clearly, they differ. It is easy to see that the formula Oi¬Ojp,
which was not satisfiable under |=c, is satisfiable under |=e. In addition, the formula
Ni¬Ojp∧Li¬Ojp, which is satisfiable under |=′, is not satisfiable under |=e. In both
cases, it seems that the behavior of |=e is more appropriate. On the other hand, all
three semantics agree in the case where our intuitions are strongest, ONL−n . Since
the axiom system AX characterizes how our earlier two semantics deal with ONL−n ,
this is shown by the following result.
Theorem 5.5 If ϕ ∈ ONL−n , then AX ⊢ ϕ iff AX
′ ⊢ ϕ.
Proof It is easy to see that each axiom of AX is sound in AX′. It follows that
AX ⊢ ϕ implies AX′ ⊢ ϕ. For the converse, it suffices to show that if ϕ ∈ ONL−n
is consistent with AX, then it is also consistent with AX′, i.e., that Sat(ϕ) holds.
We show this by induction on the structure of ϕ, much in the same way we proved
Proposition 5.1. We can assume without loss of generality that ϕ is a conjunction in
the normal form described Lemma 3.12. It is easy to see that if we can deal with the
case that ϕ is an i-subjective formula, then we can deal with arbitrary ϕ by repeated
applications of V4 followed by an application of V2. Thus, suppose that ϕ is an
i-subjective formula which is consistent with AX. We can assume that ϕ is of the
form Liα∧¬Li¬β1∧ . . .∧¬Li¬βk∧Niγ∧¬Ni¬δ1∧ . . .∧¬Ni¬δm. We must have that
α∧ βj is consistent for j = 1, . . . , k, and that γ ∧ δl is AX-consistent for l = 1, . . . ,m,
for otherwise ϕ would not be AX-consistent. Similarly, by Lemma 3.14, we must have
that α ∨ γ is K45n-provable, otherwise ϕ would not be AX-consistent. We can now
apply V3 and the inductive hypothesis to show that α is AX′-consistent.
Thus, we maintain all the benefits of the earlier semantics with this approach.
Moreover, while it is just as intractable to compute whether (M e, w) |= α for a par-
ticular world w in the extended canonical model as it was in all our other approaches,
we can show that the validity problem for this logic is no harder than that for K45n
alone. It is PSPACE-complete.
Theorem 5.6 The problem of deciding if AX ′ ⊢ ϕ is PSPACE-complete.
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Proof PSPACE hardness follows from the PSPACE hardness of K45n [9].
11 We
sketch the proof of the upper bound. First of all, observe that it suffices to deal with
the case that ϕ is in ONLn, since we can then apply the arguments of Corollary 5.2
to remove all occurrences of Val from inside out. We consider the dual problem of
consistency. Thus, we want to check if Sat(α) holds. The first step is to convert α
to the normal form of Lemma 3.12. Observe that α is consistent iff at least one of
the disjuncts is consistent. Although the conversion to normal form may result in
exponentially many disjuncts, each one is no longer than α. Thus, we deal with them
one by one, without ever writing down the full disjunction. It suffices to show that we
can decide if each disjunct is consistent in polynomial space, since we can then erase
all the work and start over for the next disjunct (with a little space necessary for
bookkeeping). We now proceed much as in the proof of Proposition 5.1. By applying
V4 repeatedly and then V2 (as in the previous theorem), it suffices to deal with
i-subjective formulas. We then apply V3 to get simpler formulas, and repeat the
procedure. We remark that this gives another PSPACE decision procedure for K45n,
quite different from that presented in [9].
To what extent do the three properties we have been focusing on hold under the
|=e semantics? Suppose we take the conceivable states from i’s point of view to be the
maximal consistent sets of i-objective formulas with respect to AX′, or equivalently,
the set of i-objective formulas true at some world inM e. Let obei (M
e, w) consist of all
the i-objective formulas true at world w in the extended canonical model (under the
|=e semantics) and let Obei (M
e, w) = {obei (M
e, w′) | w′ ∈ Kei (w)}. It is easy to see
that the first two properties we isolated hold under this interpretation of conceivable
state. However, it is quite possible that the “possible states” at a world (M c, w), that
is, Obei (M
c, w), and the “impossible states”, that is, {obei (M
c, w′) | w′ ≈i w,w /∈
Kei (w)} are not disjoint.
Interestingly, this semantics does not satisfy the third property we isolated. Not
all subsets of conceivable states arise as the set of possible states at some situation
(M e, w). A proof analogous to that of Lemma 3.7 shows that Obei (M,w) is always
limit closed. In the canonical model approach, limit closure prevents an agent from
considering certain desirable sets of states. Now this is no longer the case, despite
limit closure. Roughly speaking, we avoid problems by having in a precise sense
“enough” possibilities. More precisely, given any consistent i-objective formula α, it
is possible for agent i to only know α by virtue of considering all maximal sets of i-
objective formulas which contain α. Thus, as we suggested earlier, the third property
we isolated in the beginning turns out to be somewhat too strong—it is sufficient but
not necessary once we allow for enough possibilities.
6 Multi-Agent Nonmonotonic Reasoning
In this section, we demonstrate that the logic developed in Section 5 captures multi-
agent autoepistemic reasoning in a reasonable way. We do this in two ways. First we
show by example that the logic can be used to derive some reasonable nonmonotonic
inferences in a multi-agent context. We then show that the logic can be used to
11The result in [9] is proved only for KD45n, but the same proof applies to K45n.
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extend the definitions of stable sets and stable expansions originally developed for
single agent autoepistemic logic to the multi-agent setting.
6.1 Formal Derivations of Nonmonotonic Inferences
In this section, we provide two examples of how the logic can be used for nonmonotonic
reasoning.
Example 6.1 Let p be agent i’s secret and suppose imakes the following assumption:
unless I know that j knows my secret assume that j does not know it. We can prove
that if this assumption is all i believes then he indeed believes that j does not know
his secret. Formally, we can show
⊢ Oi(¬LiLjp⇒ ¬Ljp)⇒ Li¬Ljp.12
A formal derivation of this theorem can be obtained as follows. Let α = ¬LiLjp⇒ ¬Ljp.
The justifications in the following derivation indicate which axioms or previous deriva-
tions have been used to derive the current line. PL or K45n indicate that reasoning
in either standard propositional logic or K45n, which are subsumed by AX
′, is used
without further analysis.
1. Oiα⇒ Liα PL
2. Oiα⇒ Ni¬α PL
3. (Liα ∧ ¬LiLjp)⇒ Li¬Ljp K45n
4. Ni¬α⇒ (Ni¬LiLjp ∧NiLjp) K45n
5. Sat(p) V2
6. Sat(p)⇒ Sat(¬Ljp) V3
7. Sat(¬Ljp) V1, PL
8. Sat(¬Ljp)⇒ (NiLjp⇒ ¬LiLjp) A5′n
9. NiLjp⇒ ¬LiLjp PL
10. Oiα⇒ ¬LiLjp 2; 4; 9; PL
11. Oiα⇒ Li¬Ljp 1; 3; 10; PL
To see that i’s beliefs may evolve nonmonotonically given that i knows only α, assume
that i finds out that j has found out about the secret. Then i’s belief that j does
not believe the secret will be retracted. In fact, i will believe that j does believe the
secret. Formally, we can show
⊢ Oi(Ljp ∧ α)⇒ LiLjp.
Notice that the logic itself is a regular monotonic logic; the nonmonotonicity of agent
i’s beliefs is hidden within the Oi-operator.
All the formulas that appear in the proof above are in ONL−n . Thus, we could
have used the somewhat simpler proof theory of Section 3.1. To obtain an example
where we need the full power of AX′, simply replace Ljp by Ojp, that is i now uses
the default that unless he knows that j only knows p, then he assumes that j does not
only know p. In other words, i (prudently) makes rather cautious assumptions about
i’s epistemic state and assumes that i usually knows more than just p. The proof is
very similar to the one above. The only difference is that we now have to establish
that Sat(¬Ojp) is provable, which is straightforward.
12Note that if we replace Ljp by p we obtain regular single-agent autoepistemic reasoning.
27
Example 6.2 Now let p stand for “Tweety flies”.13 We want to show that if j knows
that all i knows about Tweety is that by default it flies, then j knows that i believes
that Tweety flies. As before, we capture the fact that all i believes is that, by default,
Tweety flies, by saying that all i believes is that, unless i believes that Tweety does
not fly, then Tweety flies. Thus, we want to show
⊢ LjOi(¬Li¬p⇒ p)⇒ LjLip.
We proceed as follows:
1. Oi(¬Li¬p⇒ p)⇒ Lip as above, with Ljp replaced by ¬p
2. Lj(Oi(¬Li¬p⇒ p)⇒ Lip) 1; Necn
3. LjOi(¬Li¬p⇒ p)⇒ LjLip 2; K45n
In a sense, i is able to reason about j’s ability to reason nonmonotonically essentially
by simulating j’s reasoning pattern.
A situation where i knows that all j knows is α seems hardly attainable in practice,
since an agent usually has at best incomplete information about another agent’s be-
liefs. It would seem much more reasonable if we could say that i knows that α is
all j knows about some relevant subject, say Tweety. This issue is dealt with in [13],
where the canonical-model approach is extended to allow statements of the kind that
all agent i knows about x is y. It is shown that the forms of nonmonotonic reasoning
just described, when restricted to ONL−n , go through just as well with the weaker
notion of only knowing about.
6.2 i-Stable Sets and i-Stable Expansions
Single-agent autoepistemic logic was developed by Moore [15] using the concepts of
stable sets and stable expansions. Levesque proved that there is a close relationship
between stable sets and only-knowing in the single-agent case. Here we prove an
analogous relationship for the multi-agent case. We first need to define a multi-agent
analogue of stable sets.
In the single-agent case, it is well known that a stable set is a complete set of
formulas that agent i could know in some situation; that is, a set S is stable if
and only if there is a situation (W,w) such that S = {α | (W,w) |= Lα}. This is
the intuition that we want to extend to the multi-agent setting, where the underlying
language is now ONLn. First we define logical consequence in the extended canonical
model in the usual way: If Γ is a set of formulas, we write M e |= Γ if M e |= γ′ for
each formula γ′ ∈ Γ. We say that γ is an e-consequence of Γ, and write Γ |=e γ,
exactly if M e |= Γ implies M e |= γ.
Definition 6.3 Let Γ be a set of formulas in ONLn. Γ is called i-stable iff
(a) if Γ |=e γ then γ ∈ Γ,
(b) if α ∈ Γ then Liα ∈ Γ,
(c) if α 6∈ Γ then ¬Liα ∈ Γ.
13Regular readers of papers on nonmonotonic logic will no doubt be gratified to see Tweety’s
reappearance.
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Note that the only difference between i-stable sets and the original definition
of stable sets is in condition (a), which requires i-stable sets to be closed under e-
consequence instead of tautological consequence (i.e., logical consequence in proposi-
tional logic) as in the single-agent case. Using e-consequence rather than tautological
consequence makes no difference in the single-agent case; in the multi-agent case it
does. Intuitively, we want to allow the agents to use e-consequence here to capture
the intuition that it is common knowledge that all agents are perfect reasoners under
the extended canonical model semantics. For example, if agent i believes ¬Ljp for a
different agent j, then we want him to also believe Nj¬Ljp. To do this, we need to
close off under e-consequence.
The next theorem shows that i-stable sets do indeed satisfy the intuitive require-
ment. We define an i-epistemic state to be a set Γ of ONLn-formulas such that for
some situation (M e, w) in the extended canonical model, Γ = {α ∈ ONLn | (M e, w) |=
Liα}; in this case, we say that Γ is the i-epistemic situation corresponding to (M
e, w).
For a set of ONLn-formulas Γ, let Γ = {γ | γ ∈ ONLn and γ 6∈ Γ}, LiΓ = {Liγ | γ ∈
Γ}, and ¬LiΓ = {¬Liγ | γ ∈ Γ}.
Theorem 6.4 Let Γ be a set of ONLn-formulas. Γ is i-stable iff Γ is an i-epistemic
state.
Proof It is straightforward to show that every i-epistemic state is i-stable. To show
the converse, let Γ be i-stable. We need to show that it is also an i-epistemic state.
Certainly LiΓ is consistent. If Γ contains all ONLn-formulas, that is, if agent i
is inconsistent, then let (M e, w) be a situation where Kei (w) = ∅; such a situation
clearly exists. Then Γ is the i-epistemic situation corresponding to (M e, w). If Γ
is a proper subset of the ONLn-formulas, then Γ must be consistent. (If Γ were
inconsistent, by the first property of stable sets, Γ would contain all formulas.) In
particular, this means that p ∧ ¬p /∈ Γ for a primitive proposition p. The second
property of stable sets guarantees that LiΓ ⊆ Γ, while the third guarantees that
¬Li(p ∧ ¬p) ∈ Γ. Since Γ is consistent, so is LiΓ ∪ {¬Li(p ∧ ¬p)}. W e consists
of all the maximal consistent sets (with respect to AX′); thus, there must be some
w∗ ∈W e that contains LiΓ∪{¬Li(p∧¬p)}. We claim that Γ is the i-epistemic state
corresponding to (M e, w∗). Thus, we must show that ϕ ∈ Γ iff (M e, w∗) |= Liϕ. To
see this, first suppose that ϕ ∈ Γ. Thus, Liϕ ∈ LiΓ. By construction, w∗ contains
LiΓ. By Theorem 5.3, we have that (M
e, w∗) |= Liϕ. On the other hand, if ϕ /∈ Γ,
then, since Γ is i-stable, we have that ¬Liϕ ∈ Γ. By the previous argument, it follows
that (M e, w∗) |= Li¬Liϕ. From A4n, it follows that (M e, w∗) |= ¬Liϕ, and hence
(M e, w∗) 6|= Liϕ. This proves the claim.
Moore [15] defined the notion of a stable expansion of a set A of formulas in the
single-agent case. Intuitively, a stable expansion of A is a stable set containing A all
of whose formulas can be justified, given A and the formulas believed in that stable
set. Further discussion and justification of the notion of stable expansion can be
found in [6, 15]. Rather than discussing this here, we go directly to our multi-agent
generalization of Moore’s notion.
Definition 6.5 Let A be a set of ONLn-formulas. Γ is called an i-stable expansion
of A iff Γ = {γ ∈ ONLn | A ∪ LiΓ ∪ ¬LiΓ |=e γ}.
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It is easy to see that an i-stable expansion is an i-stable set. The definition of i-stable
expansions looks exactly like Moore’s definition of stable expansions except that we
again use e-consequence instead of tautological consequence. As in the case of stable
sets, this is necessary to capture the fact that it is common knowledge that all agents
can do reasoning under the extended canonical model semantics.
We now generalize a result of Levesque’s [14] (who proved it for the single-agent
case), showing that the i-stable expansions of a formula α correspond precisely to the
different situations where i only knows α. We first need a lemma.
Lemma 6.6 Let (M e, w) be a situation with
Σ = {Liγ | (M
e, w)|=Liγ} ∪ {¬Liγ | (M
e, w)|=¬Liγ}.
For any α, there is an i-objective formula α∗ such that
(a) Σ |=e α⇔ α∗,
(b) (M e, w) |= (Liα⇔ Liα∗) ∧ (Niα⇔ Niα∗).
Proof Given a formula ϕ, we say that a subformula Liψ of ϕ occurs at top level if
it is not in the scope of any modal operators. Let α∗ be the result of replacing each
top-level subformula of α of the form Liγ (resp., Niγ) by true if Σ |=e Liγ (resp.,
Σ |=e Niγ) and by false otherwise. Clearly α∗ is i-objective. Moreover, a trivial
argument by induction on the structure of α shows that Σ |= α ⇔ α∗: If α is a
primitive proposition then α∗ = α; if α is of the form α1 ∧ α2 or ¬α′, then the result
follows easily by the induction hypothesis; if α is of the form Ljβ for j 6= i, then
α = α∗, since α has no top-level subformulas of the form Liϕ; finally, if α is of the
form Liβ, then α
∗ is either true or false, depending on whether Liβ is in Σ. Since
either Liβ or ¬Liβ must be in Σ, the result is immediate in this case too. Part (b)
follows immediately from part (a), since if w′ ≈i w, we must have (M e, w′) |= Σ, so
(M e, w′) |= α⇔ α∗.
Theorem 6.7 Let w be a world in the extended canonical model and let Γ be the
i-epistemic state corresponding to (M e, w). Then, for every ONLn-formula α, we
have that (M e, w)|=Oiα iff (a) Γ is an i-stable expansion of {α} and (b) K
e
i (w) and
N ei (w) are disjoint.
Proof Let Σ = LiΓ∪¬LiΓ. To prove the “only if” direction, suppose (M e, w)|=Oiα.
The disjointness ofKei (w) andN
e
i (w) follows immediately from the fact that (M
e, w)|=Liα∧
Ni¬α. To prove that Γ is an i-stable expansion of {α}, it suffices to show that for all
ONLn-formulas β, we have (M e, w)|=Liβ iff {α} ∪ Σ |=e β.
First suppose that {α} ∪ Σ |=e β. Since (M e, w)|={Oiα} ∪ Σ, and every for-
mula in Σ is of the form Liγ or ¬Liγ, it easily follows that (M e, w)|=Liα and
(M e, w)|=LiΣ. Hence, (M e, w′)|=α and (M e, w′)|=Σ for every w′ ∈ Kei (w). It follows
that (M e, w′)|=β and, therefore, (M e, w)|=Liβ.
For the converse, suppose that (M e, w)|=Liβ. We want to show that {α}∪Σ |=e β.
By Lemma 6.6, we can assume without loss of generality that β is i-objective. (For
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if not, we can replace β by an i-objective β∗ such that Σ |=e β ⇔ β∗ and (M e, w) |=
Liβ ⇔ Liβ∗, prove the result for β∗, and conclude that it holds for β as well.) To show
that {α}∪Σ |=e β, we must show that for all worlds w′ such that (M e, w′)|={α}∪Σ,
we have (M e, w′) |= β. By Lemma 6.6, there is an i-objective formula α∗ such that
(M e, w) |= Oα ⇔ Oα∗ and Σ |=e α ⇔ α∗. Thus, (M e, w) |= Niα∗ ∧ Liβ. By the
arguments of Lemma 3.14 (which apply without change to the extended canonical
model semantics), it must be the case that |=e α∗ ⇒ β. Since Σ |=e α ⇔ α∗, it
follows that {α} ∪ Σ |=e β. Since (M e, w′)|={α} ∪ Σ by assumption, we have that
(M e, w′)|=β, as desired.
To prove the “if” direction of the theorem, suppose that Kei (w) and N
e
i (w) are
disjoint and that for all ONLn-formulas β, we have (M
e, w)|=Liβ iff {α} ∪ Σ |=
e β.
We need to show that (M e, w)|=Oiα, that is, (M e, w)|=Liα ∧Ni¬α.
Since {α} ∪ Σ |=e α, the fact that (M e, w)|=Liα follows immediately. To prove
that (M e, w)|=Ni¬α, let w
′ ∈ N ei (w) and assume, to the contrary, that (M
e, w′)|=α.
Since w′ ∈ N ei (w), it follows that Σ ⊆ w
′. Hence w/Li ⊆ w′, from which w′ ∈ Kei (w)
follows, contradicting the assumption that Kei (w) and N
e
i (w) are disjoint.
7 Conclusion
We have provided three semantics for multi-agent only-knowing. All agree on the
subset ONL−n , but they differ on formulas involving nested Ni’s. Although a case
can be made that the |=e semantics comes closest to capturing our intuitions for
“knowing at most”, our intuitions beyond ONL−n are not well grounded. It would
certainly help to have more compelling semantics corresponding to AX′.
On the other hand, it can be argued that semantics does not play quite as crucial
a role when dealing with knowing at most as in other cases. The reason is that
the structures we must deal with, in general, have uncountably many worlds. For
example, whichever of the three semantics we use, there must be uncountably many
worlds i-accessible from a situation (M,w) satisfying Oip, at least one for every i-set
that includes p. To the extent that we are interested in proof theory, the proof theory
associated with |=e, characterized by the axiom system AX′, seems quite natural.
The fact that the validity problem is no harder in this setting than that for K45n
adds further support to its usefulness. Of course, as we suggested above, rather
than only knowing, it seems more appropriate to reason about only knowing about
a certain topic. Lakemeyer [13] provides a semantics for only knowing about, using
the canonical-model approach. It would be interesting to see if this can also be done
using the other approaches we have explored here.
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